Provide a concise bullet list of CBCS requirements. Details are not needed or desired at this time

Here is a concise bullet list of the CBCS safety requirements outlined in SSP-50038B:

Control hazardous functions where inadvertent activation/deactivation could lead to critical or catastrophic hazards.

Tolerate no combination of two failures or operator actions causing catastrophic hazards.
Ensure redundancy and alternate functional paths.
Provide fault tolerance with independent control paths for critical functions.

Comprehensive analysis, testing, and documentation for all safety-related functionalities.
Continuous monitoring of status, failure, and hazard data.

Let me know if you need further details on any specific area!

Redo this, not summarized, but using the label for each requirement

Here is a labeled bullet list based on the requirements as structured in SSP-50038B:

System Level CBCS Safety Requirements

3.1: A CBCS shall control hazardous functions where inadvertent activation or deactivation could result in critical or catastrophic hazards.

General CBCS Requirements

3.1.1.1: Safely initialize to a known, safe state.
3.1.1.2: Perform an orderly shutdown of a function to a known, safe state upon receipt of a termination command or detection of a termination condition.
3.1.1.3: Processors shall continue to operate safely during off-nominal power conditions or include design features to safe the processor.
3.1.1.4: Overrides shall require at least two independent actions by the operator.
3.1.1.5: Reject commands received out of sequence where executing them could cause a hazard.
3.1.1.6: Detect and recover from inadvertent memory modification during use.
3.1.1.7: Recover to a known safe state upon detection of an anomaly within the CBCS.
3.1.1.8: Discriminate between valid and invalid external inputs, recovering to a safe state in case of invalid input.
3.1.1.9: Ensure all flight software is traceable to a system or software requirement.
3.1.1.10: Document all code.
3.1.1.11: Perform integrity checks for data or commands exchanged across transmission or reception lines.
3.1.1.12: Provide privacy for uplink audio communications and protection against unauthorized uplink commands.
3.1.1.13: Reject hazardous commands that fail prerequisite checks.

CBCS "Must Work" Function Requirements

3.1.2.1.1: Provide two independent and unique command messages for deactivation of a capability if its loss could result in a catastrophic hazard.
3.1.2.1.2: Provide two independent and unique command messages for deactivation if its loss could result in a critical hazard.
3.1.2.1.3: Require at least one independent operator action for each operator-initiated command message used for shutdown.
3.1.2.1.4: Provide a non-identical method for commanding safety-critical functions if software provides the sole control.
3.1.2.1.5: Ensure alternate or redundant functional paths are separate or protected to prevent loss from a single credible event.
3.1.2.1.6: Automatically recover or safe hazardous functions within specified timeframes to prevent catastrophic or critical hazards.

CBCS "Must Not Work" Function Requirements

3.1.3.1.1: Perform prerequisite checks before executing hazardous commands.
3.1.3.1.2: Require unique command messages to enable inhibit removal.
3.1.3.1.3: Ensure command messages for inhibit state changes are unique for each inhibit.
3.1.3.1.4: Make inhibit status available to crew and ground operators.
3.1.3.1.5: Include functionally independent parameters to verify commands issued by automated sequences.
3.1.3.1.6: Ensure operator-controllable parameters are checked before execution of hazardous commands initiated by automated sequences.
3.1.3.1.7: Require at least one independent operator action for commands removing an inhibit controlling a hazard.
3.1.3.1.8: Provide software inhibit status to the crew or ground operators.
3.1.3.1.9: Provide necessary data for manual system safing to the crew or operators.
3.1.3.1.10: Ensure a processor does not independently control multiple inhibits to a hazard.

3.1.3.2.1: Provide inhibit status for catastrophic or critical hazards to operators.
3.1.3.2.2: Use a separate control path (SCP) for each inhibit controlling a hazard.
3.1.3.2.3: Ensure unique command messages are required to change the inhibit state.
3.1.3.2.4: Include a functionally independent parameter in SCP checks initiated by automated sequences.
3.1.3.2.5: Ensure at least one functionally independent parameter checked by SCPs is operator-controllable.
3.1.3.2.6: Require independent operator action for commands removing a hazard-controlling inhibit.
3.1.3.2.7: Use SCPs with different functionalities for each hazard control inhibit.
3.1.3.2.8: Provide software inhibit status to the operators.
3.1.3.2.9: Monitor system status to detect hazardous conditions requiring automated or operator intervention.

Let me know if further elaboration is required on any of these requirements.